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Abstract
We study Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms in centralized
matching markets under incomplete information. We show that truth-telling
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the revelation game induced by a common
belief and a stable mechanism if and only if all the profiles in the support
of the common belief have singleton cores. Our result matches the observa-
tions of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the National Resident Matching Program
(NRMP) in the United States: (i) the cores of the profiles submitted to the
clearinghouse are small and (ii) while truth-telling is not a dominant strategy
most participants of the NRMP truthfully reveal their preferences.
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1 Introduction
In entry-level professional labor markets new workers search for their first positions at
firms. Such markets diﬀer in how they match workers and firms. In a decentralized
market, workers and firms are themselves responsible in looking for partners. For
example, in the first half of the 20th century the entry-level medical markets in the
United States and the United Kingdom were decentralized. This had the eﬀect that
hospitals (the firms) were oﬀering promising medical students (or workers) earlier
and earlier contracts.1 By the 1950s students often signed a contract two years before
finishing. This caused ineﬃciencies and subsequent regret among the participants of
the entry-level medical market: either the student did not develop as expected and
the hospital could have later hired a better physician or the student developed much
better than expected and could have gotten a job at a better hospital. Thus, the
realized matching was often unstable: some students and hospitals were committed
to now unacceptable partners or unmatched pairs were preferring each other to their
committed partners. Due to these problems entry-level medical markets in the U.S.
were reorganized from the 1950s by centralizing them through the National Resident
Matching Program (NRMP). Each year a clearinghouse announces the open positions
at each hospital and the finishing medical students which will be available (around
20,000 per year). Salaries are not negotiated and included in the job description.
Therefore, each participant’s preference is a ranking over his potential partners. Then
all participants submit their preference lists to the clearinghouse and a mechanism
determines a matching for the submitted lists. In other words, a centralized matching
market together with a mechanism induces a preference revelation game. The success
of the reorganizations depended on which mechanism was used in determining the
matching between students and hospitals. A mechanism is stable if it always selects a
stable matching of the declared profile. It has been observed that stable mechanisms
1Roth and Xing (1994) and Niederle and Roth (2003) describe other entry-level professional labor
markets experiencing unravelling of appointment dates.
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perform better than unstable ones.2
There is a considerable amount of literature analyzing strategic incentives in cen-
tralized matching markets when the submitted lists are common knowledge among
the participants. A central result is that no stable mechanism exists for which stating
the true preferences is a dominant strategy for every agent under complete informa-
tion (Roth, 1982). Thus, for any stable mechanism there are situations at which some
agents gain by manipulation.
Roth and Peranson (1999) have examined submitted preference lists by hospitals
and students in the National Residents Matching Program for the years 1987, 1993,
1994, 1995, and 1996 and found that the number of stable matchings for the submitted
profiles were surprisingly small. To explain this unexpected fact, Roth and Peranson
(1999) suggest the following conjecture (they call it a new kind of “core convergence”
result):3 As the size of the market increases, the number of stable matchings becomes
smaller provided that each participant only ranks (in his/her reported preference
ordering) at most a fixed number of positions (which remains small when the number
of participants increase). Moreover, the small size of the core suggests limited ability
to benefit from manipulating submitted preferences. Thus, Roth and Peranson (1999)
infer that a significant number of participants truthfully reveal their preferences.
Under the more realistic context of incomplete information, our paper will show in a
simplified matching market why participants truthfully reveal their preferences and
the cores of the submitted lists are small.
In centralized matching markets the common knowledge assumption of the sub-
mitted lists is extremely strong. Thus, we will consider preference revelation games
induced by a stable mechanism under incomplete information. Agents have a common
belief and their beliefs of the others’ submitted lists are calculated through Bayes’
2Niederle and Roth (2003) report the existence of about 100 markets and submarkets organized
via stable mechanisms and that only 3 of them were abandoned after being used for several years.
3It is well-known that in the two-sided, one-to-one matching markets the eﬀective coalitions are
only individuals or pairs, and hence, the core coincides with the set of stable matchings.
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rule for every realization of an individual preference relation. Any stable mechanism
is ordinal, i.e., it determines the stable matching through the submitted ordinal rank-
ings. Thus, truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium if for every von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility function submitting the induced ordinal ranking maximizes the
agent’s expected utility in the Bayesian revelation game induced by the common belief
and the stable mechanism.4 This requirement is equivalent to the concept of ordinal
Bayesian Nash equilibrium which is based on first-order stochastic dominance in the
sense that each agent plays a best response to the others’ strategies for every von
Neumann-Morgenstern representation. We show in Theorem 1 that truth-telling is
an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian revelation game induced by
a common belief and a stable mechanism if and only if the support of the common
belief is contained in the set of profiles with singleton core. Our result matches the
following of Roth and Peranson (1999) in the NRMP: (i) they observed the cores
of the submitted lists are small and (ii) they conjecture that a significant number
of participants truthfully reveal their preferences. Two recent papers have identified
strong but meaningful suﬃcient conditions on preference profiles under which the core
of a matching market is a singleton. Eeckhout (2000) proposes a condition, which
is also necessary for markets with a small number of participants, that includes the
following two special cases. (1) Vertical heterogeneity, where all firms have identi-
cal preferences over workers (for instance, according to the student’s grades) and all
workers have identical preferences over firms (for instance, according to a public and
objective ranking of hospitals). (2) Horizontal heterogeneity, where all agents have
diﬀerent preferences over the other side of the market, but each agent has a diﬀerent
most preferred partner and in addition is the most preferred by this partner. Clark
(2003) proposes a (stronger) suﬃcient condition (called the No Crossing Condition),
which is closely related to the well-known Single Crossing Condition.
4This notion was introduced by d’Aspremont and Peleg (1988) who call it “ordinal Bayesian
incentive-compatibility”. Majumdar and Sen (2004) use it to relax strategy-proofness in the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem.
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We complement Theorem 1 in Theorem 2 by showing that a list of strategies is
an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the Bayesian revelation game induced by a
belief and a stable mechanism only if for each preference profile in the support of the
common belief all agents unanimously agree that the matching selected by the stable
mechanism for the declared preference lists is most preferred among all matchings
in the core. This suggests a new and additional reason, based on the incomplete
information nature of real matching markets, of why stable mechanisms last and why
cores are small.
Our paper is the first complete analysis of equilibria of preference revelation games
induced by stable mechanisms when participants have incomplete information about
the ordinal preferences of all other agents. Roth and Rothblum (1999) and Ehlers
(2002a,b) provide advice on the list that a particular worker should submit to the
clearinghouse, given her uncertainty about the rankings submitted by the other par-
ticipants. These papers give advice under diﬀerent hypothesis on the information
structure of the beliefs held by the worker and for diﬀerent mechanisms. Following
the mechanism design literature on direct revelation games under incomplete infor-
mation we assume that agents have a common belief on the set of all profiles which
may limit (as in all games with incomplete information) the applicability of our re-
sults. However, note that a priori we do not impose any condition on the common
belief (such as symmetry of agents’ beliefs or independence). Furthermore we con-
sider a simplified one-to-one version of matching markets. Nevertheless one-to-one
matching markets are a reasonable approximation of many-to-one matching markets.
Think of each firm representing a department of a hospital and suppose that each
department has at most one position for its medical specialty. Each department pos-
sesses its own ranking over students. Then Theorem 1 remains unchanged if several
departments together are allowed to misrepresent their true preferences, i.e. hospi-
tals cannot misrepresent their preferences such that each department strictly gains.
Moreover, one-to-one matching markets may arise for instance in regional medical
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markets for a certain specialty where each institution has (at most) one position for
this speciality.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 defines the matching market and
preference revelation games. Section 3 introduces incomplete information in these
games and ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section 4 contains the result for truth-
telling. Section 5 focuses on general ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria. Section 6
concludes. The Appendix collects all the proofs.
2 The Matching Market
The agents in our market consist of two disjoint sets, the set of firms F and the set
of workers W . Generic agents are denoted by v ∈ V ≡ F ∪W while generic firms
and workers are denoted by f and w, respectively. Each worker w ∈ W has a strict,
transitive, and complete preference relation Pw over F ∪ {w}, and each firm f ∈ F
has a strict, transitive, and complete preference relation Pf over W ∪ {f}. Let Pv
denote the set of all preference relations of agent v. In order to compare (potentially)
identical partners of v according to the preference relation Pv we denote by Rv the
binary relation where for all v0, bv ∈ V , v0Rvbv means that either v0 = bv or v0Pvbv. Given
Pw ∈ Pw and v ∈ F ∪{w}, let B(v, Pw) denote the weak upper contour set of Pw at v;
i.e., B(v, Pw) = {v0 ∈ F ∪ {w} | v0Rwv}. Let A(Pw) denote the set of firms which are
acceptable to w under Pw; i.e., A(Pw) = {f ∈ F | fPww}. Given Pw and a subset of
firms S ⊆ F , let Pw|S denote the strict ordering on S consistent with Pw. Similarly,
given Pf ∈ Pf , v ∈ W ∪ {f} and S ⊆ W , we define B(v, Pf), A(Pf) and Pf |S. Let
P ≡ ×v∈VPv. Elements of P are called (preference) profiles. To emphasize the role
of agent v’s preference in the profile P ∈ P we will write it as (Pv, P−v).
A matching market is a triple (F,W,P ), where F is a set of firms, W is a set
of workers, and P is a preference profile. Because F and W will remain fixed, a
matching market is simply a profile P ∈ P. The assignment problem consists of
matching workers with firms, keeping the bilateral nature of their relationship and
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allowing for the possibility that both, firms and workers, may remain unmatched.
Namely, a matching is a function µ : V → V satisfying the following properties: (m1)
for all w ∈ W , µ (w) ∈ F ∪ {w}; (m2) for all f ∈ F , µ (f) ∈ W ∪ {f}; and (m3) for
all v ∈ V , µ (µ (v)) = v. We say that agent v is unmatched under µ if µ (v) = v. Let
M denote the set of all matchings.5
A matching is stable if no worker or firm prefers to be unmatched (individual
rationality) and no unmatched pair mutually prefer each other to their assigned part-
ners (pair-wise stability). Namely, given a profile P ∈ P a matching µ ∈M is stable
under P if (s1) for all v ∈ V , µ (v)Rvv; and (s2) there exists no pair (w, f) ∈W ×F
such that fPwµ (w) and wPfµ (f). Gale and Shapley (1962) show that the set of
stable matchings under P is non-empty and coincides with the core of the matching
market P ; that is, there is no loss of generality if we assume that all blocking power is
carried out only by individual agents and by worker-firm pairs. We denote by C (P )
the set of stable matchings under P (or the core induced by P ).
The core of a matching market has a lattice structure (Knuth (1976) attributes
this result to John Conway; see Roth and Sotomayor (1990) for the formal statement
and proof of this result). Therefore, the core of a matching market contains two
stable matchings, µF and µW , the two extremes of the complete lattice (called the
firms-optimal stable matching and the workers-optimal stable matching, respectively)
which have the property that firms (workers) unanimously agree that µF (µW ) is the
best stable matching; moreover, the optimal stable matching for one side of the market
is the worst stable matching for the other side.
Whether or not a matching is stable depends on the preferences of agents, and
since they constitute private information, agents have to be asked about them. A
mechanism requires each agent v to report some preference relation Pv ∈ Pv and
associates a matching with the reported profile. Formally, a mechanism is a function
5We are following the convention of extending the preference relation Pv from the original set
of potential partners to the set of all matchings M by identifying a matching µ with µ (v). For
instance, to say that firm f prefers µ0 to µ means that either µ0 (f) = µ (f) or else µ0 (f)Pfµ (f).
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ϕ : P → M mapping each preference profile P ∈ P to a matching ϕ [P ] ∈ M.
Therefore, ϕ [P ] (v) is the agent matched to v at preference profile P by mechanism
ϕ. A mechanism ϕ is stable if for all P ∈ P, ϕ [P ] ∈ C (P ).
The deferred-acceptance algorithm defined by Gale and Shapley (1962) is a stable
mechanism that produces either µF or µW depending on the side of the market that
makes the oﬀers. At any step of the algorithm in which firms make oﬀers (denoted
by DAF : P → M), each firm f proposes to the most-preferred worker among
the set of workers that have not already rejected f during previous steps, while a
worker w accepts the most-preferred firm among the set of current oﬀers plus the
firm provisionally matched to w in the previous step (if any). The algorithm stops at
the step when either all oﬀers are accepted or firms have no more acceptable workers
to whom they want to make an oﬀer; the provisional matching becomes then definite
and is the stable matching µF ; i.e., DAF [P ] = µF for all P ∈ P. Symmetrically if
workers make oﬀers, and the outcome of the algorithm (denoted by DAW : P →M)
is the stable matching µW ; i.e., DAW [P ] = µW for all P ∈ P.6
When each agent has complete information about the preference relations of all
other agents then: (1) No stable mechanism exists for which stating the true pref-
erences is a dominant strategy for every agent (Roth, 1982). (2) Truth-telling is a
dominant strategy for one side of the market if the deferred-acceptance algorithm
selects that side’s optimal stable matching (Dubins and Freedman (1981) and Roth
(1982)). Therefore, if the core is singleton for a matching market, then the deferred-
acceptance algorithm chooses the same matching independently of the side which
makes oﬀers. However, in general this fact does not allow us to conclude that for any
stable mechanism truth-telling is Nash equilibrium whenever the true profile has a
singleton core.
6Strictly speaking, the DA-algorithm is an algorithm that finds the matching chosen by the “DA-
mechanism”. However, most of the matching literature uses the term DA-algorithm when referring
to both the algorithm and the mechanism. We follow this convention.
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3 Incomplete Information
We give up the usual assumption that the submitted lists are common knowledge
and consider Bayesian preference revelation games induced by a stable mechanism
and a common belief which is shared among all agents. A common belief over P
is a probability distribution P˜ over P. Given v ∈ V , let P˜v denote the marginal
distribution of P˜ over Pv. Given a common belief P˜ and a preference relation Pv, let
P˜−v|Pv denote the probability distribution over P−v conditional on Pv.7
A random matching µ˜ is a probability distribution over the set of matchingsM.
Let µ˜ (v) denote the probability distribution which µ˜ induces over v’s set of potential
partners (F ∪ {w} if v = w and W ∪ {f} if v = f).8
A mechanism ϕ and a common belief P˜ define an (ordinal) game of incomplete
information as follows. A strategy of v is a function sv : Pv → Pv specifying for each
type of v a list that v submits to the mechanism. A strategy profile is a list s = (sv)v∈V
associating with each agent a strategy. Given a mechanism ϕ : P →M and a common
belief P˜ over P, a strategy profile s : P → P induces a randommatching in the follow-
ing way: for all µ ∈M, Pr{P˜ = P | ϕ[s (P )] = µ} is the probability of matching µ.
However, the relevant random matching for agent v, given his type Pv and a strategy
profile s, is ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (where s−v(P˜−v|Pv) is the probability distribution
over P−v which s−v induces conditional on Pv). Note that ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] (v)
is the distribution which the random matching ϕ[sv (Pv) , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)] induces over
v’s set of potential partners.
All mechanisms used in centralized matching markets are ordinal. In other words
the only relevant information for a mechanism are the agents’ rankings over their sets
of potential partners. In this environment truth-telling is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
whenever for every von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM)-utility submitting the induced
7Note that we do not impose any condition on the common belief such as symmetry of agents’
beliefs or independence.
8Formally, if v = w, then Pr{µ˜(v) = f} =Pµ∈M:µ(v)=fPr{µ˜ = µ} for all f ∈ F and Pr{µ˜(v) =
v} =Pµ∈M:µ(v)=vPr{µ˜ = µ}.
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ordinal ranking maximizes an agent’s expected utility in the Bayesian preference
revelation game induced by the common belief and the mechanism. Equivalently,
truth-telling is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium (OBNE) if the distribution over
his partners when reporting the true ranking stochastically dominates any distribution
over his partners when submitting another ranking (given the others’ strategies and
the common belief).
A random matching µ˜ stochastically Pf−dominates a random matching µ˜0, de-
noted by µ˜ (f)mPf µ˜0 (f), if for all v ∈W ∪{f} , Pr{µ˜ (f) = v0 | v0Rfv} ≥ Pr{µ˜0 (f) =
v0 | v0Rfv}. Similarly, µ˜ (w)mPw µ˜0 (w) means that random matching µ˜ stochastically
Pw−dominates random matching µ˜0.
Definition 1 Let P˜ be a common belief over P. Then truth-telling is an Ordinal
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (OBNE) in the mechanism ϕ iﬀ for all v ∈ V and all
Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0 we have
ϕ[Pv, P˜−v|Pv ](v)mPv ϕ[P 0v, P˜−v|Pv ](v)
for all P 0v ∈ Pv.
More generally, a strategy profile is an ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibrium when-
ever for any agent’s true ordinal preference submitting the ranking specified by his
strategy maximizes his expected utility for every vNM-utility representation of his
true preference. This requires that an agent’s strategy only depends on the ordinal
ranking induced by his vNM-utility function. Of course, this is true for truth-telling.
Furthermore, ordinal strategies are meaningful if an agent only observes his ordinal
ranking and may have (still) little information about his utilities of his potential
partners.
Definition 2 Let P˜ be a common belief over P. Then a strategy profile s is an
Ordinal Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (OBNE) in the mechanism ϕ iﬀ for all v ∈ V
and all Pv ∈ Pv such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0 we have
ϕ[sv(Pv), s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)mPv ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v)
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for all P 0v ∈ Pv.9
Observe that, given a common belief P˜ , the set of OBNE in a mechanism ϕ is non-
empty. For instance, the constant strategy in which all agents declare that no agent
in the other side of the market is acceptable is an OBNE in ϕ since the mechanism
selects, at all profiles P and (P−v, P 0v), the empty matching.
4 Truth-Telling and Singleton Cores
We will show that the observation that the cores of the submitted lists are small
(Roth and Peranson, 1999) and that participants reveal their true preferences are
intimately related in our simplified matching market since both have a simple and
simultaneous equilibrium explanation.
We will be interested in the profiles with a singleton core. The support of P˜ is the
set of profiles on which P˜ puts a positive weight. Formally, for all P ∈ P, P belongs
to the support of P˜ if and only if Pr{P˜ = P} > 0.
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief. Then truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable
mechanism if and only if the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with
a singleton core.
By Theorem 1, participants truthfully reveal their true preference because the
submitted lists have a singleton core. Profiles with a singleton core can arise very
easily. For instance, let each hospital oﬀer a position for a certain medical speciality
and suppose that each hospital ranks as acceptable only the students who studied
its position specific speciality. Furthermore, suppose that all hospitals who have a
9In the definition of an OBNE optimal behavior of agent v is only required for the preferences
of v which arise with positive probability under P˜ . If Pv ∈ Pv is such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} = 0, then
the conditional belief P˜−v|Pv cannot be derived from P˜ . However, we could complete the belief of v
in the following way: let P˜−v|Pv put probability one on a profile where all other agents submit lists
which do not contain v.
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position for specialty A rank the students who studied speciality A in the same way,
say according to some objective criterion like their grades. Then, independently of
the students’ preferences, the core is always a singleton. Now if the common belief
is such that any profile in its support has the properties as described above, then
Theorem 1 applies and each participant cannot do better than truthfully reveal his
preferences.
Remark 1 Theorem 1 can be read as truth-telling is an OBNE if and only if
the support of P˜ is contained in the profiles for which under complete information
truth-telling is a best response to the other’s strategies. Obviously Theorem 1 is
not necessarily true in general Bayesian games. For instance, consider the game of
matching pennies. Interpret each of the two player’s strategies (heads or tails) as
his possible types. If each player’s type arises with the same probability, then truth-
telling is an OBNE but there is no Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies.
Remark 2 Of course, truth-telling is not the unique OBNE in a stable mechanism
even when the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with a singleton core.
To see this, let {P 1, ..., PK} be an arbitrary set of profiles with the property that for
all 1 ≤ k ≤ K and all v ∈ V ,
¯¯
C
¡
P k
¢¯¯
= 1 and
P k
0
v 6= P kv for all k0 6= k. (1)
For each k, let µk be an individually rational matching relative to the profile P k and let
ϕ be a stable mechanism. We know, by Roth and Sotomayor (1990), that there exists
P¯ k ∈ P such that ϕ[P¯ k] = µk and P¯ k is a NE of the direct preference revelation game
induced by ϕ. Observe that, in general, P¯ k is not equal to P k. Let P˜ be a common
belief over P with support on {P 1, ..., PK}. Consider any strategy profile s = (sv)v∈V ,
where sv : Pv → Pv has the property that sv
¡
P kv
¢
= P¯ kv for all k and all v ∈ V . It
is immediate to see that, since condition (1) holds and P¯ k is a NE of the complete
information game induced by the mechanism ϕ (with preferences P k), s is an OBNE
in the stable mechanism ϕ. However, this equilibrium is arbitrary and without much
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predictive power since it requires extremely large amounts of coordination among all
agents. In contrast, truth-telling arises as a natural and simple behavior in large
markets where this coordination is literally unfeasible.
Remark 3 Much attention has been paid to the incentives that members of a
couple who want to live together face when looking coordinately for two jobs in entry-
level professional markets (see Roth (1984a), Roth and Sotomayor (1990), Dutta and
Massó (1997), Roth and Peranson (1999), Cantala (2002), Roth (2002), Klaus and
Klijn (2003), and Klaus, Klijn and Massó (2003)). A straightforward extension of the
proof of Theorem 1 shows that, under its assumptions, no couple can misrepresent
coordinately their preferences in a stable mechanism ϕ such that both members of the
couple strictly benefit. To see this, let P˜ be a common belief with support contained
in the set of all profiles with a singleton core. Let w and w0 be a couple and assume
that all remaining agents are truth-telling. Because in the stable mechanism DAW
no subset of workers can gain by jointly misrepresenting their preferences we have
that, similarly as in the proof of Theorem 1, for all P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
ϕ [P ] (v)Rvϕ[P 0w, P 0w0 , P−{w,w0}] (v) for v = w or v = w0.
Therefore, truth-telling is a joint best response for the couple w and w0. Note that
the same is true for any set of firms, i.e. truth-telling is a best response for any
set of firms. Thus, if each firm represents the department of a hospital and each
department has at most one open position (in its medical speciality), then hospitals
cannot misrepresent the preferences of their departments such that all departments
strictly gain.
Remark 4 Theorem 1 is the first result for matching problems which relates sin-
gleton cores to incentive-compatibility in an incomplete information setup. Under
complete information Sönmez (1999) showed for general allocation problems with in-
divisibilities that a mechanism is incentive-compatible (truth-telling is a dominant
strategy), Pareto-optimal and individually rational if and only if for each problem
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the core is a singleton and the mechanism chooses this allocation. Since a matching
market may not have a singleton core, Sönmez’s result implies that in our model there
is no mechanism which is both stable10 and incentive-compatible under complete in-
formation. In our model Theorem 1 can be viewed as the incomplete information
analogue of Sönmez’s result for matching markets in the sense that a belief is allowed
to put positive probability only on profiles with a singleton core if a mechanism is
both stable and Bayesian incentive-compatible.
5 Ex-post Unanimity and Small Cores
Theorem 1 characterized the common beliefs for which a specific strategy profile
is an OBNE. In this result the singleton core condition on the common belief was
independent of which stable mechanism is used. The key feature of the mechanism
was its stability and not whether workers or firms make proposals like in the DA-
algorithm.
Generally, however, whether a strategy profile is an OBNE may depend on the
stable mechanism. We will generalize the necessary condition of Theorem 1. We will
show that a necessary condition for a strategy profile to be an OBNE is that for any
profile belonging to the support of the common belief, the stable mechanism chooses
the matching which is unanimously most preferred in the core of the submitted profile.
This is more likely when the core of the submitted profile is “small” in terms of the
true profile. If the submitted profile is one with singleton core (like in Theorem 1),
then this condition is trivially satisfied.
Theorem 2 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable
mechanism. If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ, then any profile belonging
to the support of P˜ has the following property: all agents unanimously agree that the
matching chosen by ϕ for the submitted profile is most preferred among all matchings
10Stability implies individual rationality and Pareto-optimality in our model.
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in the core of the submitted profile. Formally, for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
we have ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvµ(v) for all v ∈ V and all µ ∈ C(s(P )).
If a common belief, a strategy profile and a mechanism satisfy the ex-post una-
nimity condition of Theorem 2, then by strictness of preferences, for any (true) profile
P belonging to the support there is a unique matching µ in the core of the submitted
profile which is most preferred under the true profile and which has to be chosen by
the mechanism, i.e., µ = ϕ[s(P )]. This implies that the belief cannot attribute posi-
tive probability to a profile where some agents’ preferences are opposed for any two
matchings belonging to the core of the submitted profile. However, ex-post unanimity
does not require that the core of the submitted profile is a singleton.
Generally, the condition in Theorem 2 is not suﬃcient for a profile of strategies to
be an OBNE.11 Whether or not it is satisfied depends on both the stable mechanism
and the agents’ strategies. Furthermore, this condition is not suﬃcient for the core
of the submitted profile to be a singleton since ex-post unanimity is in terms of the
true profile.
6 Conclusion
Our analysis of ordinal Bayesian Nash equilibria of stable mechanisms under incom-
plete information confirms some already known reasons of why stable mechanisms
arose and lasted for many years in centralized two-sided matching markets, and sug-
gests some additional ones. First, under incomplete information, truth-telling remains
a plausible behavior if and only if the cores of the support of the common belief are
singleton; hence, the stability of the realized matching is guaranteed. This is an im-
11For instance, let P˜ be a belief putting probability one on a profile P under which all agents
rank acceptable all potential partners. Further let s(P ) be such that each worker truthfully reveals
her preference and each firm submits an empty list (ranking all workers unacceptable). Then the
condition in Theorem 2 is satisfied but s(P ) is obviously not an OBNE. Any firm gains by revealing
its true preference.
15
portant property and becomes critical if the market has to be redesigned. Second,
this feature of equilibrium behavior is independent of the chosen stable mechanism.
This is significant since the two sides of the matching market have opposite interests
on the set of stable matchings (and thus, on possible alternative stable mechanisms).
Third, equilibrium is reinforced because each participant is matched to the best pos-
sible partner, that is, the partner most preferred among those he is matched to by
any stable matching relative to the declared profile.
At a more conceptual level, one may ask why a centralized market mechanism
is needed when truth-telling is an equilibrium. The problem is that in decentralized
markets there are frictions because it is diﬃcult for agents to communicate with all
possible partners to find out their preferences. Furthermore, during this search agents
are unlikely to reveal their complete preferences and unravelling may occur.
Overall, we (unexpectedly) found that the more realistic and potentially richer
strategic setting of incomplete information reinforces some of the reasons already
given to explain why many of the entry-level professional labor markets have been
operating in a relatively smooth way for so many years.
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APPENDIX
In the Appendix we prove Theorems 1 and 2.
A Truth-Telling
Theorem 1 Let P˜ be a common belief. Then truth-telling is an OBNE in a stable
mechanism if and only if the support of P˜ is contained in the set of all profiles with
a singleton core.
Proof. Let ϕ be a stable mechanism.
(⇐) Let P˜ be such that for all P ∈ P, Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 implies |C(P )| = 1. Let
P ∈ P be such that |C(P )| = 1. We show that under complete information P is a
Nash Equilibrium in the direct preference revelation game induced by ϕ. We show
that Pv is a best response to P−v for all v ∈ V .
Let v ∈W . By |C(P )| = 1,
DAW [P ] = ϕ[P ]. (2)
Truth-telling is dominant strategy for v under DAW (Dubins and Freedman, 1981;
Roth, 1982). However, in general this fact does not allow us to conclude that Pv is
a best response to P−v for v under the stable mechanism ϕ. We will show that for
any possible deviation of v at ϕ, there exists a deviation of v at DAW such that v is
matched to the same partner as under v’s deviation at ϕ.
Let P 0v ∈ Pv. Let P 00v ∈ Pv be such thatA(P 00v ) = {ϕ[P 0v, P−v](v)} if ϕ[P 0v, P−v] (v) ∈
F and A (P 00v ) = ∅ if ϕ[P 0v, P−v] (v) = v. By construction of P 00v and stability of ϕ,
ϕ[P 0v, P−v] ∈ C(P 0v, P−v) implies ϕ[P 0v, P−v] ∈ C(P 00v , P−v). Since the set of unmatched
agents is identical under any two stable matchings, the stability of DAW and the
construction of P 00v yield
DAW [P
00
v , P−v](v) = ϕ[P 0v, P−v](v). (3)
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Because for DAW a worker cannot gain by misrepresentation we have
DAW [P ](v)RvDAW [P
00
v , P−v](v). (4)
Hence, by (2), (3), and (4), ϕ[P ](v)Rvϕ[P 0v, P−v](v), the desired conclusion.
Using |C(P )| = 1 and DAF [P ] = ϕ[P ], similarly as above it follows that for all
v ∈ F and P 0v ∈ Pv, ϕ[P ](v)Rvϕ[P 0v, P−v](v).
Let v ∈ V and Pv ∈ Pv be such that Pr{P˜v = Pv} > 0. Because for all P−v ∈ P−v
such that Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0 we have |C(Pv, P−v)| = 1 and under complete
information Pv is a best response to P−v in the direct preference revelation game, it
follows that submitting Pv is a best response for agent v. Hence, truth-telling is an
OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ.
(⇒) Suppose that there exists P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 and |C(P )| ≥ 2.
Then (i) there exists w ∈ W such that DAW [P ](w)Pwϕ[P ](w) or (ii) there exists
f ∈ F such that DAF [P ](f)Pfϕ[P ](f). Without loss of generality, suppose that
(i) holds. Let DAW [P ](w) = f 0. Let P 0w ∈ Pw be such that P 0w|F = Pw|F and
A(P 0w) = B(f
0, Pw).
Let P 0−w ∈ P−w be such that Pr{P˜ = (Pw, P 0−w)} > 0. Since we will show that
truth-telling is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ by looking at the probability
Pr{ϕ[Pw, P˜−w|Pw ] (w) ∈ B (f 0, Pw)}, assume P 0−w is such that ϕ[Pw, P 0−w](w)Rwf 0.
Then ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] ∈ C
¡
Pw, P
0
−w
¢
implies ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] ∈ C(P 0w, P 0−w) since individ-
ual rationality of ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] at profile
¡
Pw, P
0
−w
¢
implies individual rationality of
ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] at profile
¡
P 0w, P
0
−w
¢
and (wˆ, fˆ) blocks ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] at profile
¡
P 0w, P
0
−w
¢
implies (wˆ, fˆ) blocks ϕ[Pw, P 0−w] at profile
¡
Pw, P
0
−w
¢
as well. Thus, by A(P 0w) =
B(f 0, Pw) and the fact that under any two stable matchings the set of unmatched
agents is identical, ϕ[P 0w, P 0−w](w)Rwf 0. We next show that ϕ[P 0w, P−w] (w) = f 0.
Suppose ϕ [P 0w, P−w] (w) = w. Then DAW [P 0w, P−w] (w) = w. Therefore
DAW [Pw, P−w] (w) = f
0P 0ww = DAW [P
0
w, P−w] (w) ,
which contradicts the fact that for w truth-telling is a dominant strategy in the
direct preference revelation mechanism induced byDAW under complete information.
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A similar argument shows that f 0R0wϕ [P 0w, P−w] (w). Thus ϕ [P 0w, P−w] (w) = f 0.
Furthermore, Pr{P˜−w|Pw = P−w} > 0, f 0Pwϕ[P ](w), and ϕ[P 0w, P−w](w) = f 0. Hence,
Pr{ϕ[Pw, P˜−w|Pw ](w) ∈ B(f 0, Pw)} < Pr{ϕ[P 0w, P˜−w|Pw ](w) ∈ B(f 0, Pw)},
which means that truth-telling is not an OBNE in the stable mechanism . ¥
B Small Cores
Theorem 2 Let P˜ be a common belief, s be a strategy profile, and ϕ be a stable
mechanism. If s is an OBNE in the stable mechanism ϕ, then any profile belonging to
the support of P˜ has the following property: for all P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0,
we have ϕ[s(P )](v)Rvµ(v) for all v ∈ V and all µ ∈ C(s(P )).
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exist P ∈ P such that Pr{P˜ = P} > 0 and
µ(v)Pvϕ[s(P )](v) for some v ∈ V and µ ∈ C(s(P )). Because ϕ is stable and the set
of unmatched agents is identical under any two stable matchings, we have µ(v) 6= v
and ϕ[s(P )](v) 6= v. Without loss of generality, suppose that v ∈ W , µ(v) = f , and
f is Pv-most preferred in C(s(P )).
Let sv(Pv) = P 0v. Let P
00
v ∈ Pv be such that (i) A(P 00v ) = A(P 0v)∩B(f, Pv) and (ii)
P 00v |A(P 00v ) = P 0v|A(P 00v ). We show that
Pr{ϕ[P 00v , s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv)} > Pr{ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P˜−v|Pv)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv)}, (5)
which contradicts the fact that s is an OBNE.
Let P 0−v ∈ P−v be such that Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P 0−v} > 0 and ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P 0−v)](v) ∈
B(f, Pv). By stability of ϕ, ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P 0−v)] ∈ C(P 0v, s−v(P 0−v)). By construction of
P 00v , ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P 0−v)] ∈ C(P 00v , s−v(P 0−v)). Since the set of unmatched agents is iden-
tical under any two stable matchings, ϕ[P 0v, s−v
¡
P 0−v
¢
] (v) ∈ B (f, Pv) implies that
ϕ[P 0v, s−v
¡
P 0−v
¢
] (v) 6= v, and hence ϕ[P 00v , s−v
¡
P 0−v
¢
] (v) 6= v. Thus, ϕ[P 00v , s−v(P 0−v)](v) ∈
A(P 00v ), and by A(P
00
v ) ⊆ B(f, Pv), ϕ[P 00v , s−v(P 0−v)](v) ∈ B(f, Pv).
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By construction of P 00v and since µ ∈ C(P 0v, s−v(P−v)), µ ∈ C(P 00v , s−v(P−v)). More-
over, since µ (v) = f and the set of unmatched agents is identical under any two sta-
ble matchings, ϕ[P 00v , s−v(P−v)](v) 6= v. By A(P 00v ) ⊆ B(f, Pv), ϕ[P 00v , s−v(P−v)](v) ∈
B(f, Pv). Furthermore, Pr{P˜−v|Pv = P−v} > 0 and ϕ[P 0v, s−v(P−v)](v) /∈ B(f, Pv).
Hence, (5) is true. ¥
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